I know some info regarding the Colombian press links to DTO’s isn’t exactly breaking news, but I found this article to be very interesting, pulling back some of the wool covering the eyes of the people buying into the war on drugs bullshit.
Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe linked to international drug trafficking through Sinaloa Cartel
By Julian James
16 January 2020
Allegations have recently emerged linking Colombia’s former right-wing president and current senator Álvaro Uribe with Mexican drug cartels, right-wing paramilitary groups and the American Drug Enforcement Agency in a plot to traffic large quantities of cocaine into Mexico between 2006 and 2008.
If true, the allegations would represent the latest in a series of incidents and revelations exposing the so-called “war on drugs” waged by the United States and Colombia as a phony pretext for decades of militarization, as well as the intimate role played by both countries’ governments in the lucrative multi-billion-dollar narcotics industry.
Uribe has long been a dominant figure in Colombian politics and is the chief political patron of current President Iván Duque, who heads the Democratic Center (CD) party founded by Uribe in 2014. Before the most recent allegations, Uribe had already been under investigation since 2018 by the Colombian Supreme Court on charges of tampering of witnesses who had testified that he was one of the founders of the far-right paramilitary group Bloque Metro when he was governor of the province of Antioquia. Recent revelations that the military has been spying on the prosecutors involved in this case, with President Duque being fully aware, have fueled widespread popular opposition to his administration, which has an approval rating of merely 24 percent.
A series of nationwide strikes and protests against government corruption, social inequality, political assassinations and state violence erupted on November 21, 2019, and are set to resume on January 21, with none of the protesters’ demands having been met. The protests have been the largest in Colombia since 1977 and are part of a region-wide and global resurgence of class struggle.
The recent allegations against Uribe were made by a former security chief for Colombian airliner Air Cargo Lines, in an interview with whistleblower and investigative journalist Richard Maok. Maok, a former detective and IT specialist with the Cuerpo Tecnico de Investigacion (CTI, the Colombian equivalent of the FBI) went public two decades ago with strong evidence showing top right-wing paramilitary figures working in close coordination with the army, intelligence agencies and other government institutions, including congress, to install Álvaro Uribe as the future president of Colombia.
For his exposures of criminality in the Colombian state, Maok faced death threats and assassination attempts, and was granted political asylum in Canada where he continues his journalistic activities and remains a fierce critic of the Colombian government.
According to the Air Cargo Lines security chief, between 2006-2008, while president, Uribe received large bribes from representatives of the Sinaloa Cartel in exchange for helping traffic 10,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico. As part of the deal, Uribe authorized the construction of a hangar on the grounds of a Bogotá airport to be used as a logistical hub for the operation, and instructed the country’s aviation authority to allow a privately owned Mexican DC8 aircraft to fly in and out of the country without first passing through customs.
The cocaine exported was provided by the Colombian Paísa cartel, which was composed of ex-members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), accurately described by Latin American crime research organization Insight Crime as “a coalition of right-wing death squads that used the [civil war] to camouflage their illicit economic activities [including] drug trafficking, displacement, kidnapping, and extortion.”
The AUC paramilitary group has been exposed by Richard Maok as playing a key role in bringing Uribe to power in 2000. The latest whistleblower interviewed by Maok also alleges that he met several times at the American embassy with Emir Abreu, an official of the American Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stationed in Colombia, who gave his blessing for the operation. The arrangement ended in 2006 when a metric ton of cocaine went missing from the sixth shipment to Mexico.
While the former airline security official has chosen to remain anonymous, the allegations appear credible in light of other reports connecting Uribe to Colombian paramilitary and drug trafficking organizations. These date back to the early 1980s, when Uribe, then head Colombia’s civil aviation agency, was accused of giving air licenses to drug traffickers.
Previously classified cables from the early 1990s released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and State Department in 2018 describe a politically emergent Álvaro Uribe as a “close personal friend” of Pablo Escobar, the richest and most powerful narco-trafficker in the world. Uribe was said to be “dedicated to collaboration” with Escobar’s Medellín Cartel, at the time responsible for most of the cocaine imported to the United States. The Medellín Cartel terrorized the population of the city and surrounding Antioquia region from 1976 to 1993, assassinating thousands and making Medellín the murder capital of the world.
As for the United States, among the most infamous drug trafficking episodes in the last five decades was the CIA’s facilitation in the mid-80’s of cocaine trafficking from Colombia through Panama into the United States by the CIA-backed Contra guerrilla group that waged a bloody insurgency against the left-nationalist Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Public exposure and a congressional investigation into the sordid affair did nothing to end the ongoing involvement of powerful sections of the state in international drug trafficking.
As the WSWS noted in 2014:
Relations between the US ruling elite and organized crime have flourished in the decades since the Contra war. In April 2006, the capture of a cocaine-laden DC9 owned by the Sinaloa cartel exposed money laundering operations by Wachovia bank on behalf of the massive cartel, which operates across more than 40 countries. The cartel, responsible for 25 percent of illegal drugs sold in the US, passed some $370 billion to Wachovia, investigators found. Large infusions of drug money played a key role in stabilizing the finances of the big banks during the 2008 financial crisis, according to top UN official for drugs and crime Antonio Maria Costa. During a 2012 Al Jazeera interview, an official spokesman for the government of Mexico's Chihuahua province accused the CIA of “managing the drug trade.”
Another notable incident possibly linking the CIA to the Colombian drug trade was the crash in 2007 of a Florida-based Gulfstream II Jet over Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. Several tons of cocaine were discovered on the jet, which took off from the Rio Negro airport in Medellín, Colombia.
As documented by the WSWS, the bill of sale for the Gulfstream jet was listed as Greg Smith, a pilot previously employed by the FBI, DEA and ICE. The sale of the aircraft was facilitated by the son of Ismael Zambada Garcia, a top official in the Sinaloa Cartel, through Wachovia accounts. Highlighting the interconnection between the fraudulent “war on drugs” and “war on terror,” the plane was also identified as being involved in the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” and torture program, transporting captives to secret prisons around the globe.
The most recent revelations about Alvaro Uribe’s involvement with international cocaine smuggling further expose that large sections of the Colombian state—the closest ally of US imperialism in South America—are deeply involved in the multi-billion-dollar cocaine industry stretching from Colombia to Mexico and the United States.
Colombia’s more than three-decade-long US-backed “war on drugs” was waged under the auspices of “Plan Colombia.” Launched under the Democratic administration of President Bill Clinton in 1998, it funneled some $10 billion in mostly military aid to Colombia, financing a bloody counter-insurgency campaign that killed many tens of thousands, while driving millions from their homes.
The so-called drug war in Colombia, like that in the US itself, has served as a smokescreen for government criminality, while providing a pretext for violence inflicted upon the broader population. In Colombia, this “war on drugs” has translated into decades of militarization, political assassinations, the indiscriminate murder of workers, the poisoning of the rural population through Vietnam-style aerial fumigation and support for right wing death squads such as the AUC.
Seriously WTF is World Socialist Website as a source of anything?
frank...I saw an article similar to this. I can't remember if I posted it on Mainboard, I meant to....
The way I see it.... the more people that don't like me, the less people I have to please
So this piece is fake? I was gonna say whoaaaaa linked to the DEA with proof? But if site fake then dang lol
Seeing is believing
yes I am not familiar with them either
The way I see it.... the more people that don't like me, the less people I have to please
Is that site for Russian propaganda?
Seeing is believing
It’s true, this site is not one I was previously aware of and I should have done some more fact checking before posting. That said, US government assets have been involved in drug trafficking since the contra affair, and the complicity of banks such as Wachovia in laundering cartel money is well documented. This short article from insight provides some more documentation of the charges levelled against the Colombian president. I posted the original article as food for thought and many of the statements within have been corroborated by other more well known news sources
The Case Against Uribe
ANALYSISWritten by Geoffrey Ramsey -JULY 19, 2012
While former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has faced mounting allegations of drug trafficking and paramilitary ties, he has proved to be surprisingly immune from criminal charges.
On June 9, Colombian think tank Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris published an investigation which revealed that the United States has requested the extradition of a niece of ex-President Alvaro Uribe and her mother on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. Dolly Cifuentes Villa and her daughter, Ana Maria Uribe Cifuentes, were arrested in 2011 and accused of helping Mexico’s powerful Sinaloa Cartel traffic cocaine into the US and laundering illicit profits. The two are members of the notorious Cifuentes Villa family, which allegedly smuggled more than 30 tons of cocaine into the US from 2009 to 2011.
The news sparked controversy in Colombia, as it exposed Uribe Cifuentes as the daughter of the former president’s brother Jaime Uribe, who died of throat cancer in 2001. The revelation raised suspicions that Jaime may have had links to organized crime, which would have troublesome implications for his brother, who earned a reputation for his security gains as president. These suspicions were fueled when Nuevo Arco Iris also found that Jaime had been detained in 1986 after authorities discovered phone calls made from his car phone to infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar. The ex-president dismissed this as well, noting that Jaime had been freed and investigators determined that his phone “had been cloned by criminals.”
One day after the report’s publication, Alvaro Uribe sought to downplay his brother’s relationship with Cifuentes. He claimed to have no knowledge of the extramarital affair, in spite of Ana Maria’s birth certificate listing Jaime as her biological father and the fact that Cifuentes gave birth to another of Jaime’s children ten years later.
While the investigation has brought his deceased brother’s past into the spotlight, it looks as though Uribe himself has been untouched by the scandal. But this is hardly the first or most prominent instance in which criminal allegations have seemingly threatened the former president’s political profile, only for him to deflect them with ease.
Just two years into his first term as president, a declassified report written in 1991 by US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts in Colombia surfaced which directly linked the then-senator to Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel. The report’s authors referred to him as “a Colombian politician and senator dedicated to collaboration with the Medellin cartel at high government levels,” and went on to claim that Uribe was “a close personal friend” of Escobar’s.
This was corroborated by a onetime love interest of Escobar, Virginia Vallejo, who claimed in a 2007 book about her affair with the kingpin that he saw Uribe as an ally. Vallejo alleged that Uribe used his position as director of the country’s civil aviation authority in the early 1980s to help Escobar’s cartel obtain permits for landing strips used in drug flights.
Uribe vehemently denied the allegations, and held up his administration’s record number of drug kingpin extraditions as proof of his commitment to fighting drug trafficking. The US government stood by Uribe, acknowledging the authenticity of the report while maintaining that its content was unproven and not backed by any investigation.
In 2007, however, another US intelligence report was leaked to the Los Angeles Times, this time by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official described as “unhappy that Uribe’s government had not been held more to account by the Bush administration.” According to the report, a separate unnamed Western intelligence agency found that in 2002 Uribe tasked his defense minister, General Mario Montoya, with leading a controversial counterinsurgency push in the city of Medellin. Montoya’s campaign, known as “Operation Orion,” apparently relied heavily on support from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a right-wing paramilitary coalition with known ties to the drug trade. The CIA report said Montoya planned the operation with AUC commander Fabio Jaramillo, a confidante of paramilitary leader Diego Murillo, alias “Don Berna.”
Montoya, the local police chief, and Jaramillo all allegedly signed documents laying out the blueprints for the security strategy. While the operation successfully cracked down on guerrilla activity in the area, at least 14 people were killed and dozens were reportedly “disappeared.”
Following his reelection in 2006, allegations of paramilitary links in the Uribe administration began to snowball, and by the time he left office in 2010, numerous top officials in his government had been implicated in the growing “parapolitics scandal.”
Even though several figures close to him — like intelligence chief Jorge Noguera and Congressman Mario Uribe (a cousin of the ex-president) — have been arrested for conspiring with the AUC, Uribe has maintained that he has never had any ties to paramilitary organizations.
This has been increasingly difficult for him, however, in light of recent allegations made by imprisoned AUC commanders. In January “Don Berna” testified that he met directly with Uribe aides, who asked him to clandestinely monitor members of the Colombian Supreme Court. In May another jailed AUC head, Salvatore Mancuso, claimed to have had a hand in Uribe’s 2006 reelection, providing logistical and financial support to his campaign. He also said that he had met with Uribe in person, although he did not provide any further details.
While a good many allegations have been leveled against the ex-president, it remains to be seen whether any of them will stick. The accusations have led to a congressional investigation into Uribe’s role in the wiretapping scandal, although it has made very little progress so far. Ultimately, Uribe has a made a convincing case for his innocence: he insists the paramilitaries’ claims are simply part of a political agenda, and that their testimony cannot be trusted. Considering that the jailed warlords have so far been the only witnesses against him, he will likely emerge from this scandal unscathed once again
How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico's murderous drug gangs
As the violence spread, billions of dollars of cartel cash began to seep into the global financial system. But a special investigation by the Observer reveals how the increasingly frantic warnings of one London whistleblower were ignored
Sun 3 Apr 2011 00.04 BST First published on Sun 3 Apr 2011 00.04 BST
A soldier guards marijuana that is being incinerated in Tijuana, Mexico. Photograph: Guillermo Arias/AP
On 10 April 2006, a DC-9 jet landed in the port city of Ciudad del Carmen, on the Gulf of Mexico, as the sun was setting. Mexican soldiers, waiting to intercept it, found 128 cases packed with 5.7 tons of cocaine, valued at $100m. But something else – more important and far-reaching – was discovered in the paper trail behind the purchase of the plane by the Sinaloa narco-trafficking cartel.
During a 22-month investigation by agents from the US Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service and others, it emerged that the cocaine smugglers had bought the plane with money they had laundered through one of the biggest banks in the United States: Wachovia, now part of the giant Wells Fargo.
The authorities uncovered billions of dollars in wire transfers, traveller's cheques and cash shipments through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts. Wachovia was put under immediate investigation for failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering programme. Of special significance was that the period concerned began in 2004, which coincided with the first escalation of violence along the US-Mexico border that ignited the current drugs war.
Criminal proceedings were brought against Wachovia, though not against any individual, but the case never came to court. In March 2010, Wachovia settled the biggest action brought under the US bank secrecy act, through the US district court in Miami. Now that the year's "deferred prosecution" has expired, the bank is in effect in the clear. It paid federal authorities $110m in forfeiture, for allowing transactions later proved to be connected to drug smuggling, and incurred a $50m fine for failing to monitor cash used to ship 22 tons of cocaine.
More shocking, and more important, the bank was sanctioned for failing to apply the proper anti-laundering strictures to the transfer of $378.4bn – a sum equivalent to one-third of Mexico's gross national product – into dollar accounts from so-called casas de cambio (CDCs) in Mexico, currency exchange houses with which the bank did business.
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"Wachovia's blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their operations," said Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor. Yet the total fine was less than 2% of the bank's $12.3bn profit for 2009. On 24 March 2010, Wells Fargo stock traded at $30.86 – up 1% on the week of the court settlement.
The conclusion to the case was only the tip of an iceberg, demonstrating the role of the "legal" banking sector in swilling hundreds of billions of dollars – the blood money from the murderous drug trade in Mexico and other places in the world – around their global operations, now bailed out by the taxpayer.
At the height of the 2008 banking crisis, Antonio Maria Costa, then head of the United Nations office on drugs and crime, said he had evidence to suggest the proceeds from drugs and crime were "the only liquid investment capital" available to banks on the brink of collapse. "Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs trade," he said. "There were signs that some banks were rescued that way."
Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo during the 2008 crash, just as Wells Fargo became a beneficiary of $25bn in taxpayers' money. Wachovia's prosecutors were clear, however, that there was no suggestion Wells Fargo had behaved improperly; it had co-operated fully with the investigation. Mexico is the US's third largest international trading partner and Wachovia was understandably interested in this volume of legitimate trade.
José Luis Marmolejo, who prosecuted those running one of the casas de cambio at the Mexican end, said: "Wachovia handled all the transfers. They never reported any as suspicious."
"As early as 2004, Wachovia understood the risk," the bank admitted in the statement of settlement with the federal government, but, "despite these warnings, Wachovia remained in the business". There is, of course, the legitimate use of CDCs as a way into the Hispanic market. In 2005 the World Bank said that Mexico was receiving $8.1bn in remittances.
During research into the Wachovia Mexican case, the Observer obtained documents previously provided to financial regulators. It emerged that the alarm that was ignored came from, among other places, London, as a result of the diligence of one of the most important whistleblowers of our time. A man who, in a series of interviews with the Observer, adds detail to the documents, laying bare the story of how Wachovia was at the centre of one of the world's biggest money-laundering operations.
Martin Woods, a Liverpudlian in his mid-40s, joined the London office of Wachovia Bank in February 2005 as a senior anti-money laundering officer. He had previously served with the Metropolitan police drug squad. As a detective he joined the money-laundering investigation team of the National Crime Squad, where he worked on the British end of the Bank of New York money-laundering scandal in the late 1990s.
Woods talks like a police officer – in the best sense of the word: punctilious, exact, with a roguish humour, but moral at the core. He was an ideal appointment for any bank eager to operate a diligent and effective risk management policy against the lucrative scourge of high finance: laundering, knowing or otherwise, the vast proceeds of criminality, tax-evasion, and dealing in arms and drugs.
Woods had a police officer's eye and a police officer's instincts – not those of a banker. And this influenced not only his methods, but his mentality. "I think that a lot of things matter more than money – and that marks you out in a culture which appears to prevail in many of the banks in the world," he says.
Woods was set apart by his modus operandi. His speciality, he explains, was his application of a "know your client", or KYC, policing strategy to identifying dirty money. "KYC is a fundamental approach to anti-money laundering, going after tax evasion or counter-terrorist financing. Who are your clients? Is the documentation right? Good, responsible banking involved always knowing your customer and it still does."
When he looked at Wachovia, the first thing Woods noticed was a deficiency in KYC information. And among his first reports to his superiors at the bank's headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina, were observations on a shortfall in KYC at Wachovia's operation in London, which he set about correcting, while at the same time implementing what was known as an enhanced transaction monitoring programme, gathering more information on clients whose money came through the bank's offices in the City, in sterling or euros. By August 2006, Woods had identified a number of suspicious transactions relating to casas de cambio customers in Mexico.
Primarily, these involved deposits of traveller's cheques in euros. They had sequential numbers and deposited larger amounts of money than any innocent travelling person would need, with inadequate or no KYC information on them and what seemed to a trained eye to be dubious signatures. "It was basic work," he says. "They didn't answer the obvious questions: 'Is the transaction real, or does it look synthetic? Does the traveller's cheque meet the protocols? Is it all there, and if not, why not?'"
Woods discussed the matter with Wachovia's global head of anti-money laundering for correspondent banking, who believed the cheques could signify tax evasion. He then undertook what banks call a "look back" at previous transactions and saw fit to submit a series of SARs, or suspicious activity reports, to the authorities in the UK and his superiors in Charlotte, urging the blocking of named parties and large series of sequentially numbered traveller's cheques from Mexico. He issued a number of SARs in 2006, of which 50 related to the casas de cambio in Mexico. To his amazement, the response from Wachovia's Miami office, the centre for Latin American business, was anything but supportive – he felt it was quite the reverse.
As it turned out, however, Woods was on the right track. Wachovia's business in Mexico was coming under closer and closer scrutiny by US federal law enforcement. Wachovia was issued with a number of subpoenas for information on its Mexican operation. Woods has subsequently been informed that Wachovia had six or seven thousand subpoenas. He says this was "An absurd number. So at what point does someone at the highest level not get the feeling that something is very, very wrong?"
In April and May 2007, Wachovia – as a result of increasing interest and pressure from the US attorney's office – began to close its relationship with some of the casas de cambio. But rather than launch an internal investigation into Woods's alerts over Mexico, Woods claims Wachovia hung its own money-laundering expert out to dry. The records show that during 2007 Woods "continued to submit more SARs related to the casas de cambio".
In July 2007, all of Wachovia's remaining 10 Mexican casa de cambio clients operating through London suddenly stopped doing so. Later in 2007, after the investigation of Wachovia was reported in the US financial media, the bank decided to end its remaining relationships with the Mexican casas de cambio globally. By this time, Woods says, he found his personal situation within the bank untenable; while the bank acted on one level to protect itself from the federal investigation into its shortcomings, on another, it rounded on the man who had been among the first to spot them.
On 16 June Woods was told by Wachovia's head of compliance that his latest SAR need not have been filed, that he had no legal requirement to investigate an overseas case and no right of access to documents held overseas from Britain, even if they were held by Wachovia.
Woods's life went into freefall. He went to hospital with a prolapsed disc, reported sick and was told by the bank that he not done so in the appropriate manner, as directed by the employees' handbook. He was off work for three weeks, returning in August 2007 to find a letter from the bank's compliance managing director, which was unrelenting in its tone and words of warning.
The letter addressed itself to what the manager called "specific examples of your failure to perform at an acceptable standard". Woods, on the edge of a breakdown, was put on sick leave by his GP; he was later given psychiatric treatment, enrolled on a stress management course and put on medication.
Late in 2007, Woods attended a function at Scotland Yard where colleagues from the US were being entertained. There, he sought out a representative of the Drug Enforcement Administration and told him about the casas de cambio, the SARs and his employer's reaction. The Federal Reserve and officials of the office of comptroller of currency in Washington DC then "spent a lot of time examining the SARs" that had been sent by Woods to Charlotte from London.
"They got back in touch with me a while afterwards and we began to put the pieces of the jigsaw together," says Woods. What they found was – as Costa says – the tip of the iceberg of what was happening to drug money in the banking industry, but at least it was visible and it had a name: Wachovia.
In June 2005, the DEA, the criminal division of the Internal Revenue Service and the US attorney's office in southern Florida began investigating wire transfers from Mexico to the US. They were traced back to correspondent bank accounts held by casas de cambio at Wachovia. The CDC accounts were supervised and managed by a business unit of Wachovia in the bank's Miami offices.
"Through CDCs," said the court document, "persons in Mexico can use hard currency and … wire transfer the value of that currency to US bank accounts to purchase items in the United States or other countries. The nature of the CDC business allows money launderers the opportunity to move drug dollars that are in Mexico into CDCs and ultimately into the US banking system.
"On numerous occasions," say the court papers, "monies were deposited into a CDC by a drug-trafficking organisation. Using false identities, the CDC then wired that money through its Wachovia correspondent bank accounts for the purchase of airplanes for drug-trafficking organisations." The court settlement of 2010 would detail that "nearly $13m went through correspondent bank accounts at Wachovia for the purchase of aircraft to be used in the illegal narcotics trade. From these aircraft, more than 20,000kg of cocaine were seized."
All this occurred despite the fact that Wachovia's office was in Miami, designated by the US government as a "high-intensity money laundering and related financial crime area", and a "high-intensity drug trafficking area". Since the drug cartel war began in 2005, Mexico had been designated a high-risk source of money laundering.
"As early as 2004," the court settlement would read, "Wachovia understood the risk that was associated with doing business with the Mexican CDCs. Wachovia was aware of the general industry warnings. As early as July 2005, Wachovia was aware that other large US banks were exiting the CDC business based on [anti-money laundering] concerns … despite these warnings, Wachovia remained in business."
On 16 March 2010, Douglas Edwards, senior vice-president of Wachovia Bank, put his signature to page 10 of a 25-page settlement, in which the bank admitted its role as outlined by the prosecutors. On page 11, he signed again, as senior vice-president of Wells Fargo. The documents show Wachovia providing three services to 22 CDCs in Mexico: wire transfers, a "bulk cash service" and a "pouch deposit service", to accept "deposit items drawn on US banks, eg cheques and traveller's cheques", as spotted by Woods.
"For the time period of 1 May 2004 through 31 May 2007, Wachovia processed at least $$373.6bn in CDCs, $4.7bn in bulk cash" – a total of more than $378.3bn, a sum that dwarfs the budgets debated by US state and UK local authorities to provide services to citizens.
The document gives a fascinating insight into how the laundering of drug money works. It details how investigators "found readily identifiable evidence of red flags of large-scale money laundering". There were "structured wire transfers" whereby "it was commonplace in the CDC accounts for round-number wire transfers to be made on the same day or in close succession, by the same wire senders, for the … same account".
Over two days, 10 wire transfers by four individuals "went though Wachovia for deposit into an aircraft broker's account. All of the transfers were in round numbers. None of the individuals of business that wired money had any connection to the aircraft or the entity that allegedly owned the aircraft. The investigation has further revealed that the identities of the individuals who sent the money were false and that the business was a shell entity. That plane was subsequently seized with approximately 2,000kg of cocaine on board."
Many of the sequentially numbered traveller's cheques, of the kind dealt with by Woods, contained "unusual markings" or "lacked any legible signature". Also, "many of the CDCs that used Wachovia's bulk cash service sent significantly more cash to Wachovia than what Wachovia had expected. More specifically, many of the CDCs exceeded their monthly activity by at least 50%."
Recognising these "red flags", the US attorney's office in Miami, the IRS and the DEA began investigating Wachovia, later joined by FinCEN, one of the US Treasury's agencies to fight money laundering, while the office of the comptroller of the currency carried out a parallel investigation. The violations they found were, says the document, "serious and systemic and allowed certain Wachovia customers to launder millions of dollars of proceeds from the sale of illegal narcotics through Wachovia accounts over an extended time period. The investigation has identified that at least $110m in drug proceeds were funnelled through the CDC accounts held at Wachovia."
The settlement concludes by discussing Wachovia's "considerable co-operation and remedial actions" since the prosecution was initiated, after the bank was bought by Wells Fargo. "In consideration of Wachovia's remedial actions," concludes the prosecutor, "the United States shall recommend to the court … that prosecution of Wachovia on the information filed … be deferred for a period of 12 months."
But while the federal prosecution proceeded, Woods had remained out in the cold. On Christmas Eve 2008, his lawyers filed tribunal proceedings against Wachovia for bullying and detrimental treatment of a whistleblower. The case was settled in May 2009, by which time Woods felt as though he was "the most toxic person in the bank". Wachovia agreed to pay an undisclosed amount, in return for which Woods left the bank and said he would not make public the terms of the settlement.
After years of tribulation, Woods was finally formally vindicated, though not by Wachovia: a letter arrived from John Dugan, the comptroller of the currency in Washington DC, dated 19 March 2010 – three days after the settlement in Miami. Dugan said he was "writing to personally recognise and express my appreciation for the role you played in the actions brought against Wachovia Bank for violations of the bank secrecy act … Not only did the information that you provided facilitate our investigation, but you demonstrated great personal courage and integrity by speaking up. Without the efforts of individuals like you, actions such as the one taken against Wachovia would not be possible."
The so-called "deferred prosecution" detailed in the Miami document is a form of probation whereby if the bank abides by the law for a year, charges are dropped. So this March the bank was in the clear. The week that the deferred prosecution expired, a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo said the parent bank had no comment to make on the documentation pertaining to Woods's case, or his allegations. She added that there was no comment on Sloman's remarks to the court; a provision in the settlement stipulated Wachovia was not allowed to issue public statements that contradicted it.
But the settlement leaves a sour taste in many mouths – and certainly in Woods's. The deferred prosecution is part of this "cop-out all round", he says. "The regulatory authorities do not have to spend any more time on it, and they don't have to push it as far as a criminal trial. They just issue criminal proceedings, and settle. The law enforcement people do what they are supposed to do, but what's the point? All those people dealing with all that money from drug-trafficking and murder, and no one goes to jail?"
One of the foremost figures in the training of anti-money laundering officers is Robert Mazur, lead infiltrator for US law enforcement of the Colombian Medellín cartel during the epic prosecution and collapse of the BCCI banking business in 1991 (his story was made famous by his memoir, The Infiltrator, which became a movie).
Mazur, whose firm Chase and Associates works closely with law enforcement agencies and trains officers for bank anti-money laundering, cast a keen eye over the case against Wachovia, and he says now that "the only thing that will make the banks properly vigilant to what is happening is when they hear the rattle of handcuffs in the boardroom".
Mazur said that "a lot of the law enforcement people were disappointed to see a settlement" between the administration and Wachovia. "But I know there were external circumstances that worked to Wachovia's benefit, not least that the US banking system was on the edge of collapse."
What concerns Mazur is that what law enforcement agencies and politicians hope to achieve against the cartels is limited, and falls short of the obvious attack the US could make in its war on drugs: go after the money. "We're thinking way too small," Mazur says. "I train law enforcement officers, thousands of them every year, and they say to me that if they tried to do half of what I did, they'd be arrested. But I tell them: 'You got to think big. The headlines you will be reading in seven years' time will be the result of the work you begin now.' With BCCI, we had to spend two years setting it up, two years doing undercover work, and another two years getting it to trial. If they want to do something big, like go after the money, that's how long it takes."
But Mazur warns: "If you look at the career ladders of law enforcement, there's no incentive to go after the big money. People move every two to three years. The DEA is focused on drug trafficking rather than money laundering. You get a quicker result that way – they want to get the traffickers and seize their assets. But this is like treating a sick plant by cutting off a few branches – it just grows new ones. Going after the big money is cutting down the plant – it's a harder door to knock on, it's a longer haul, and it won't get you the short-term riches."
The office of the comptroller of the currency is still examining whether individuals in Wachovia are criminally liable. Sources at FinCEN say that a so-called "look-back" is in process, as directed by the settlement and agreed to by Wachovia, into the $378.4bn that was not directly associated with the aircraft purchases and cocaine hauls, but neither was it subject to the proper anti-laundering checks. A FinCEN source says that $20bn already examined appears to have "suspicious origins". But this is just the beginning.
Antonio Maria Costa, who was executive director of the UN's office on drugs and crime from May 2002 to August 2010, charts the history of the contamination of the global banking industry by drug and criminal money since his first initiatives to try to curb it from the European commission during the 1990s. "The connection between organised crime and financial institutions started in the late 1970s, early 1980s," he says, "when the mafia became globalised."
Until then, criminal money had circulated largely in cash, with the authorities making the occasional, spectacular "sting" or haul. During Costa's time as director for economics and finance at the EC in Brussels, from 1987, inroads were made against penetration of banks by criminal laundering, and "criminal money started moving back to cash, out of the financial institutions and banks. Then two things happened: the financial crisis in Russia, after the emergence of the Russian mafia, and the crises of 2003 and 2007-08.
"With these crises," says Costa, "the banking sector was short of liquidity, the banks exposed themselves to the criminal syndicates, who had cash in hand."
Costa questions the readiness of governments and their regulatory structures to challenge this large-scale corruption of the global economy: "Government regulators showed what they were capable of when the issue suddenly changed to laundering money for terrorism – on that, they suddenly became serious and changed their attitude."
Hardly surprising, then, that Wachovia does not appear to be the end of the line. In August 2010, it emerged in quarterly disclosures by HSBC that the US justice department was seeking to fine it for anti-money laundering compliance problems reported to include dealings with Mexico.
"Wachovia had my résumé, they knew who I was," says Woods. "But they did not want to know – their attitude was, 'Why are you doing this?' They should have been on my side, because they were compliance people, not commercial people. But really they were commercial people all along. We're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars. This is the biggest money-laundering scandal of our time.
"These are the proceeds of murder and misery in Mexico, and of drugs sold around the world," he says. "All the law enforcement people wanted to see this come to trial. But no one goes to jail. "What does the settlement do to fight the cartels? Nothing – it doesn't make the job of law enforcement easier and it encourages the cartels and anyone who wants to make money by laundering their blood dollars. Where's the risk? There is none.
"Is it in the interest of the American people to encourage both the drug cartels and the banks in this way? Is it in the interest of the Mexican people? It's simple: if you don't see the correlation between the money laundering by banks and the 30,000 people killed in Mexico, you're missing the point."
Woods feels unable to rest on his laurels. He tours the world for a consultancy he now runs, Hermes Forensic Solutions, counselling and speaking to banks on the dangers of laundering criminal money, and how to spot and stop it. "New York and London," says Woods, "have become the world's two biggest laundries of criminal and drug money, and offshore tax havens. Not the Cayman Islands, not the Isle of Man or Jersey. The big laundering is right through the City of London and Wall Street.
"After the Wachovia case, no one in the regulatory community has sat down with me and asked, 'What happened?' or 'What can we do to avoid this happening to other banks?' They are not interested. They are the same people who attack the whistleblowers and this is a position the [British] Financial Services Authority at least has adopted on legal advice: it has been advised that the confidentiality of banking and bankers takes primacy over the public information disclosure act. That is how the priorities work: secrecy first, public interest second.
"Meanwhile, the drug industry has two products: money and suffering. On one hand, you have massive profits and enrichment. On the other, you have massive suffering, misery and death. You cannot separate one from the other.
"What happened at Wachovia was symptomatic of the failure of the entire regulatory system to apply the kind of proper governance and adequate risk management which would have prevented not just the laundering of blood money, but the global crisis."
In reply to this post by Chivis
@Chivis, I will ensure that I cross check the facts further, when posting from an unknown news site. I posted the article because much of what was contained within is info I have read/corroborated from reputable sites such as insightcrime.org.
Still, fact checking is crucial and if there is any misinformation contained in the original post, I sincerely apologize.
I have posted further evidence confirming many of the claims, and we all know that banking cartels work hand in hand with DTO’s and other shadowy entities to launder money. Also, who is naive enough to believe that 3 letter agencies do not have a hand in trafficking.
I really don’t see a whole lot of new info/wild accusations that one cannot confirm with a little digging. The CIA DID FACILITATE AND PARTICIPATE in cocaine trafficking during the Iran-contra affair, this has been common knowledge since the 80’s. Maybe the site is unknown, PERHAPS with an anti-US agenda, but I see very little new/far-fetched info
New York University professor Christian Parenti tells viewers, “The CIA is from its very beginning collaborating with mafiosas who are involved in the drug trade because these mafiosas will serve the larger agenda of fighting communism.”
NOTHING NEW HERE PEOPLE
Maybe the info is a bit politically biased but your point about Uribe is quite accurate.
There are several dark points in this guy´s life.
1.- He was one of the promoters of Cooperativas Convivir (Convivir cooperatives) A project of public security implemented in 1994 when he was Governor of Antioquia Department. This project consisted on the founding of supposedly civil groups comprised by peasants that were allowed to wear arms (not classical shotguns but assault rifles and military armament) in order to comprise a civil platform against the FARC, ELN and EPL guerrillas. In less than 3 years the Convivir platforms had become absorbed by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia led by the Castaño brothers and ended up in turning into the Bloques or fronts which formed the main structure of the AUC (Bloque Metro, Bloque Bananero, Bloque Urabá, Bloque Centauros, etc) The Antioquia´s Bloque Metro group developed extremely close ties with Uribe´s party and in the 2000´s half of the Colombian senate was charged with the crime of partnering with the AUC
2.- The DIA list mentioned by Frank exists and is a very reliable source. The fact that Uribe was then a local politician might be the reason for the little impact this document has caused since from 1994 Uribe has been one of US´s closest allies despite the terrible crimes of which he is accused (but not judged we must admit)
The famous list comprises 104 names of close associates to the Medellin Cartel. Uribe is located in 82nd possition
Here is the acces to the whole list obtained from the NSA Archives, quite a reliable source in my opinion:
3.- His brother Santiago was charged and is being judged in Colombia for the founding and financing of the far right paramilitary group Los Doce Apóstoles (The 12 Apostles) which was active in Antioquia department during the 1990´s. He´s accused of targeting victims of the paramilitary group.
4.- There´s very reliable sources and information about the use of the AUC combat teams/commandos during Uribe´s first term in the urban operations. An example is Operation Estrella VI which was launched in 2003 against the urban FARC movement (Movimiento Bolivariano) There´s graphic evidence of paramilitaries following Government troops and consulting black lists for the social cleaning implemented in the barriadas after the army regained control of the zone
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