Forces of “El Mayo” and “El Marro” unite in Guanajuato

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Forces of “El Mayo” and “El Marro” unite in Guanajuato

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Interesting article from Sinembargo. I edited the text just a bit cause i'm really tired. Enjoy!

Forces of “El Mayo” and “El Marro” unite in Guanajuato against a common enemy: the CJNG

The alliance between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel would not be between “El Chapo” and José Antonio Yépez. In this case, it would be between the faction commanded by Mayo Zambada and Marro. No new quotas from the Sinaloa Cartel have arrived in Guanajuato. The old and worn out Sinaloa cadres that settled long ago in the entity continue to operate. "El Marro" needs the support of the Sinaloa Cartel to relieve the pressure that federal, state and CJNG governments exert on the areas under their control. But the Sinaloa Cartel can choose where to hit the CJNG. They can increase their attacks in Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Veracruz, etc. It has where to choose. Supporting Marro is not a priority.

Guanajuato, Guanajuato, Nov. 18 (Poplab) .- In recent days circulated widely on social networks for videos and recordings in which they claimed that Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman had sent a contingent nourished by sicarios to the state of Guanajuato to reinforce the armies of José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, aka "El Marro". These materials announced that the Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel had agreed to an alliance to fight a common enemy: the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) , led by Nemesio Oceguera Cervantes, aka "El Mencho".

The Government of the state of Guanajuato, in its official communication channels and with the support of its network of influencers and cyber-activists, disqualified these versions, inviting citizens to break the “fear chain” and not to share the audios and videos in appointment. As expected, due to the low credibility of the state government for the construction of narratives about the insecurity that plagues the entity, the “containment” strategy generated the opposite effect.

For most of the people who saw and heard the audios and videos (either in their original version or in their denials), if the state government denied the existence of an alliance between “El Chapo” and “El Marro”, then this pact was real and the government was just trying to hide it. For citizens, in this and in many other cases, state government is guilty, unless it proves otherwise.


The truth is that the Sinaloa Cartel has been operating in the state of Guanajuato for a long time. DEA reports from at least ten years ago reported that the Sinaloa Cartel had a presence in several municipalities of the state. More recently, in the overview of criminal organizations in Guanajuato, prepared by Lantia Consultores, it is established that the “Chapo” Guzmán's hosts are in Guanajuato, although “the Pacific-Sinaloa Cartel only maintains a presence through local alliances” . Even this report identifies different leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel (by name and surname) that command Sinaloa cells in the municipalities of León, Irapuato and Salamanca. The most important cell of the Sinaloa Cartel based in the state would be headed by Javier Ramírez Morales, aka “El Pelón”.

According to an internal Pemex document on the theft of fuels, released by the magazine Proceso in January of this year, it is established that:

“Guanajuato is also the territory of Los Pelones, headed by Javier Ramírez Morales,“ El Mónico ”or“ El Pelón ”, which steals two thousand 500 barrels of hydrocarbons per day and obtains profits of six million 400 thousand pesos by milking the Salamanca- Zacatecas and Salamanca-León.

Members of this band are Jesús Ignacio Guevara, "El Chuy", and Hugo Mosqueda Vázquez. The Plebes collude with them, such as “El Villín” and about twenty subjects, mostly from Sinaloa. His link with the authorities is nicknamed "The Puerquero".

Its main domains are the municipalities of Salamanca (communities and colonies Cárdenas, Loma de Flores, San José Temacatío, San Vicente de Flores and La Purísima) and Irapuato (San José del Marañón, El Carrizal, Malvas, El Copal and El Copalillo). "

Similarly, in May 2016 Jorge Humberto Pérez Cázares was arrested, designated as the alleged financial operator of the Sinaloa Cartel. His capture for extradition purposes occurred in San Miguel de Allende, a municipality whose real estate boom is due in part to the black financing it receives from drug cartels.

On the other hand, in mid-2017 in Celaya, Salamanca and Apaseo el Grande appeared narcomantas apparently signed by members of the Sinaloa Cartel where they resumed the CJNG's speech, and claimed to have no participation in acts committed against the civilian population, like kidnapping and extortion.

That is, somehow, state government is right. It is false that new contingents from the Sinaloa Cartel have arrived in the state of Guanajuato. They arrived for many years and carry out various activities related to drug trafficking, fuel theft, money laundering and drug trafficking.


The Sinaloa Cartel, almost from its origin, was made up of a confederation of organizations that were integrated into a single command headed by El Chapo. Due to the stays in prison of Joaquín Guzmán Loera, the command of the cartel was held alternately by the children of Chapo, Dámaso López, Nacho Coronel and Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada. By far the most brilliant, bold and qualified for driving the cartel has been El Mayo.

As with many high-flying criminal organizations, the history of the Sinaloa Cartel was built with mergers and divisions between leaders and internal groups. The Beltrán Leyva brothers, the Mencho, Edgar Valdez Villareal (a) La Barbie, Nazario Moreno etc., at some point were part of the structure of the Sinaloa Cartel or the Federation, the failed attempt of El Chapo to revive the old structure of drug lords created by Miguel Ángel Felix Gallardo and who dismantled the DEA after the torture and murder of Enrique Camarena Salazar.

This situation has caused many confusions and errors in the intelligence reports of the federal public security agencies regarding the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in the state of Guanajuato. There have been many leadership of the Sinaloa Cartel working in the state, which eventually separated from Chapo. For example, for many years the Beltrán Leyva brothers had properties and rest homes in the municipality of San Miguel de Allende. They invested in hotels and real estate developments, until some of them became prosperous and distinguished entrepreneurs in the region.

Héctor Beltrán Leyva, in fact, was arrested while eating at a restaurant in San Miguel in 2014. Despite the fact that Beltrán Leyva broke up with El Chapo, CENDRO and CISEN intelligence reports continued to record “activities for a long time” of money laundering ”of the Sinaloa Cartel in San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato. That is, the Beltran Leyva were still identified with their old membership in the Sinaloa Cartel. They clearly were no longer part of that cartel.

The same happened with the CJNG. The death of Nacho Colonel caused a succession war that would eventually give rise to the emergence of El Mencho as the main leader of the narco in the region. But El Mencho and his brothers-in-law, the Valencia brothers, were part of the Sinaloa Cartel. They formed an armed arm called the Matazetas, who worked for Nacho Colonel, who at the time became number three in the structure of the Sinaloa Cartel. The Matazetas came to have a presence in the municipality of León. When the CJNG arises, the Matazetas cells that were dispersed in Jalisco, Michoacán and Guanajuato had to decide which side they stayed with, whether with the Sinaloa Cartel or with the CJNG. The Matazetas who worked in León continued with the Sinaloa Cartel, but were no longer attached to the extinct structure of Nacho Coronel.

Therefore, tracking the origin of the Sinaloa Cartel's presence in Guanajuato is complicated. What we know for sure is that neither the cells of Chapo, nor those of Mayo Zambada had a presence in the area. The organization of the Sinaloa Cartel with presence in the state of Guanajuato was the one headed by Nacho Coronel, killed by elements of the elite body of La Marina at his Zapopan residence in July 2010.


The Sinaloa Cartel never undertook a "colonization" of the state of Guanajuato. it did not take a square, it did not eliminate narcomenudists from the competition, it did not finance candidates for positions of popular election, and so on. It was handled with a very low profile. Although it spread in cities of the industrial belt, it always did so by making alliances with local mafias dedicated to drug trafficking.

In reality, the "presence" of the Sinaloa Cartel in Guanajuato was limited to the opening of drug marketing routes. For many years, the only thing that interested the Sinaloa chiefs was to sell their product in León, Irapuato, Celaya and Salamanca. Therefore there were no chiefs of the square as such, there was no greater penetration and infiltration of municipal police and security forces. Nor did they undertake a contamination of political structures. They did not finance election campaigns, nor did they buy municipal presidents.

They even allowed some luxuries. They established a “sanctuary city” in León, where the families and second marriages of many Sinaloa lords were able to establish their wives and children in residential neighborhoods such as Gran Jardín. They financed real estate developments, led to the establishment of casinos and contributed to the opening of a legendary nightclub that hired escorts and dancers brought from abroad.

The Sinaloa Cartel took root in Guanajuato, but they were not deep roots. For the Sinaloan capos, cities such as León or San Miguel were centers for recreation and family life, where they could enjoy a quiet life, with comfort, and without having to worry about caring for their backs all the time.

Capos of the Sinaloa cartel as Juan José Quintero Payán, (a) "El Juanjo", the so-called "Queen of the Pacific", Sandra Ávila Beltrán, Luis Rodríguez Olivera (a) "El Güero", Raquel Alvarado Torres, (a) " The queen of the vans ”, etc., lived incognito in residential neighborhoods of the city of León.

All that changed with the invasion of the CJNG to the state of Guanajuato. The old heirs of Nacho Coronel, who still controlled vast areas of the city of León, were exterminated by the advanced troops of Mencho. The local mafias agglutinated in La Unión de León tried to stop the progress of the Jalisco, but they could not. For a couple of years they have been conducting a "guerrilla war" to wear out an enemy that exceeds them in number, economic power and firepower. But they are losing the war.

How much sinaloenses were the Sinaloa Cartel cells that were settled in the state? Apparently the good life and the non-existence of disputes in the territories they occupied made them slow to react. The tranquility and economic prosperity oxidized them. They were not prepared to face an oiled and ongoing army like the CJNG's. They capitulated and surrendered the place with relative ease. In addition, the exponential increase in the investigation folders for crimes against health, allows to infer that many places in Guanajuato were under-administered and wasted.

That is, local drug traffickers from cities like León and Irapuato had done nothing to expand the business. They no longer distributed product in schools to encourage consumption. They had not opened drug stores or points of sale in the new housing units of economic housing that have been built on the periphery of urban centers. They had not established drug outlets in middle and upper middle class clubs, such as those located in El Campestre or Madero Street. In a word, the local narcos became lazy. But when the new CJNG square chiefs arrived, drug use picked up in the state, reaching levels consistent with the population weight of the cities.


During the first phases of the expansion that the CJNG executed in several states, the Sinaloa Cartel maintained a passive stance. Partly because it consumed a lot of time to deal with internal conflicts; partly because the CJNG did not directly threaten its territories; partly because the sinaloenses capos mistakenly thought that El Mencho would be defeated on several of the battle fronts that he had opened in the states of the country in which he was fighting. But the latter did not happen. With a multi-million dollar investment, with boldness, a sense of opportunity and good management, the CJNG expanded. It expanded too much and the counterattack of the Sinaloa Cartel came.

In several states of the country, the Sinaloa Cartel began to finance the enemies of the CJNG to stop its progress. They even opened a front in the heart of the CJNG. the metropolitan area of ​​Guadalajara. With Nacho Coronel's nephew in front and with the support of the Jalisco State Government, headed by Enrique Alfaro, the CDS launched a large-scale onslaught against Mencho. This new battle plan of the Sinaloa Cartel represented an excellent opportunity for El Marro, leader of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel.

With an academic preparation that does not exceed basic education, José Antonio Yépez Ortiz has represented a riddle for state and federal security agencies. He set up political, social and police protection rings for the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. He did not fall back against the onslaught of the CJNG, but quite the opposite. He expanded his network and sat in places in which he had not entered, such as Guanajuato or San Miguel de Allende. In the face of betrayals by security forces, his hand did not tremble to execute bloody account adjustments against commanders and police officers. And in a few months, although with external support and advice, he learned about the geopolitics of drug cartels. Faced with adversity, El Marro grows.

Knowing that the Sinaloa Cartel was supporting and financing several enemies of the CJNG throughout the country, El Marro made contact with the Sinaloenses to explore the possibility of agreeing on an alliance with the mythical Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada.


It is very likely that the prison conditions of the "Chapo" Guzman in the United States were designed to prevent him from continuing to control the Sinaloa Cartel from a distance. The social isolation, the restriction to receive visits from their relatives and lawyers, the impediment to live with more prisoners, to have a conjugal visit, contact with communication devices, etc., is not due to mischief or evil. All this is in order to prevent El Chapo from issuing orders to the heads of the structure of his cartel. As documented by DEA agent Adrew Hogan in his book Cazando a El Chapo, Joaquín Guzmán Loera handled even the smallest detail of the large and small operations of the CDS. The same took care of the salary that Iztapalapa narcomenudists were going to receive in Mexico City, that of the purchase of large shipments of cocaine in Colombia. Therefore, the core part of Chapo's imprisonment is to leave him completely incommunicado. Do not allow him to issue a single instruction to his subordinates.

El Chapo was extradited to the United States in January 2017. He was re-apprehended in 2016 and in the year he was in Mexico before his extradition he was also in severe isolation. Therefore, it is practically impossible that emissaries of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel have established contact with El Chapo Guzmán for support. It is not feasible that El Chapo has sent a contingent of hitmen to reinforce the army of El Marro in municipalities in the southeast of the state. The information that was disseminated in social networks is false. What can be seen in the video that outraged and baffled the state government, is a contingent of gunmen from the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel patrolling and making a deterrent presence in rural communities in the municipality of Villagrán.

Consequently, the only possible contact that Marro could establish with the Sinaloa Cartel was with El Mayo Zambada, who is in charge of the Sinaloa Cartel operations in the center and west of the country. According to leaks of the first circle of El Marro (some of which were disseminated on social networks and made known by the journalist Héctor de Mauleón in his column of El Universal), contacts and negotiations between Marro and El Chapo began from last year. The usual in this type of exchanges was raised. Critical route for sending reinforcements, amount of support, future division of territories, etc.

Even El Marro came to announce the realization of the pact triumphant. And although this could exist on paper, the truth is that today not a drop of additional help from the Sinaloa Cartel has arrived at the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. No money, no training, no weapons, no cargoes, no troops. Nothing, absolutely nothing. So far, the direct or indirect external support that the Marro has received comes from the Gulf Cartel (with the sending of the Shadow Group Special Forces) and the Knights Templar, with harassment maneuvers in the rearguard of the CJNG in Pénjamo and other municipalities from the southwest of the state.

It is likely that sending support from the Sinaloa Cartel to the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel is only a matter of time. The Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, in effect, are natural allies. It would be enough for the Sinaloa Cartel to carry out high-impact maneuvers and attacks in León or the corner towns to cause the displacement of CJNG (and FSPE) troops to that area, which would alleviate the pressure on the municipalities that dominates El Marro .

The Sinaloa Cartel definitely does not want Guanajuato to fall into the hands of the CJNG. The population size and configuration of the population pyramid is conducive to the growth of the internal drug consumption market. In addition, the existence of an extensive network of PEMEX pipelines makes it possible to illegally extract fuel to supply the gigantic vehicle park used by the cartel to transport narcotics shipments north. The percentage of irrigation area in the state makes it possible to plant marijuana industrially. There are many rugged areas in the state, with crosswind, where narcolaboratories could be installed, which would be duly protected by the corrupt municipal police corporations.


But there is also the possibility that El Mayo is delaying the sending of resources and reinforcements to Marro, with the final intention of not giving anything. This is due to the profile of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. Marro's henchmen kidnap, extort and commit bank robberies. They kill police officers, execute municipal officials and milk the municipal public works budgets. They are not interested in public relations. They kill and then find out.

That is, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel is very similar to the Zetas Cartel, the eternal enemies of the Sinaloa Cartel. Within the aristocracy of drug barons the practices incurred by the Zetas were contrary to the unwritten rules of drug trafficking. The different organizations that make up the Sinaloa Cartel, in general, try to have a social base of support in the territories in which they operate. On the contrary, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel has no qualms about charging small and medium-sized merchants a floor right. They execute aldermen and little by little they have been venturing into trafficking of persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, which has triggered the figures of disappearances in several municipalities. The Sinaloa bosses see themselves as champions of social justice, while the members of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel usually have a very aggressive position against the people who inhabit the cities and towns they control. They behave like an army of occupation in search of a spoils of war.

Even in the use of the language of violence it is possible to find nuances. The bosses of the Sinaloa Cartel often resort to the pressure-bribery-negotiation of police officers and political leaders to obtain support and protection. They know that blood is expensive and bad for the business. But for Marro and the Zetas, a refusal to cooperate with them is an automatic declaration of war that is paid with death.

Something truly extraordinary would have to happen for Mayo to effectively support El Marro and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. Both cartels are different in many ways. El Marro certainly looks forward to the Sinaloa Cartel entering the war for Guanajuato, playing in his favor. But today it is not clear that this is a reciprocated love. And as everyone knows, for there to be a wedding, two hearts are required to beat at the same rate. And this does not seem to be the case between the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel.

In short, the alliance between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel would not be between the “Chapo” and José Antonio Yépez. In this case, it would be between the faction commanded by Mayo Zambada and Marro. No new quotas from the Sinaloa Cartel have arrived in Guanajuato. The old and worn out Sinaloa cadres that settled long ago in the entity continue to operate. “El Marro” needs the support of the Sinaloa Cartel to relieve the pressure that the federal, state and CJNG governments exert on the areas under their control. But the Sinaloa Cartel can choose where to hit the CJNG. You can increase your attacks in Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Veracruz, etc. It has where to choose. Supporting Marro is not a priority.

To face the TUCOM (All united against El Marro), the leader of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel has insistently sought that the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel turn to see it. But the bosses of Sinaloa do not see Marro with eyes of admiration or respect. Because beyond promises and smiles, time is running and it is not appreciated that the Sinaloans want to intervene in favor of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. El Marro should be clear that you must not fear the enemy that attacks, but the false friend that embraces. Everything seems to indicate that the Sinaloa Cartel does not want to be related to the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. And if so, you just have to be clear that the saddest thing about betrayal is that it never comes from an enemy. And that is something you should never forget when talking with a Sinaloan boss.


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Re: Forces of “El Mayo” and “El Marro” unite in Guanajuato

That was a really good read.  It's interesting how CDS basically dropped the ball.  This article does not support or object to the idea that Chapitos might be championing the alliance and providing support.  You seem well informed on the subject, what are your thoughts on Chapitos running the Marro alliance?
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Re: Forces of “El Mayo” and “El Marro” unite in Guanajuato

@Mica, I have no info on what CDS faction supports El Marro but I really think that they're there. I don't see    CSRL being able to resist so long on their own to a monster like CJNG.